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Election Forensics and the 2004
Venezuelan Presidential Recall Referendum
as a Case Study
Alicia L. Carriquiry
Abstract. A referendum to recall President Hugo Chávez was held in
Venezuela in August of 2004. In the referendum, voters were to vote YES
if they wished to recall the President and NO if they wanted him to continue
in office. The official results were 59% NO and 41% YES. Even though the
election was monitored by various international groups including the Orga-
nization of American States and the Carter Center (both of which declared
that the referendum had been conducted in a free and transparent manner),
the outcome of the election was questioned by other groups both inside and
outside of Venezuela. The collection of manuscripts that comprise this issue
of Statistical Science discusses the general topic of election forensics but also
focuses on different statistical approaches to explore, post-election, whether
irregularities in the voting, vote transmission or vote counting processes
could be detected in the 2004 presidential recall referendum. In this intro-
duction to the Venezuela issue, we discuss the more recent literature on post-
election auditing, describe the institutional context for the 2004 Venezuelan
referendum, and briefly introduce each of the five contributions.
Key words and phrases: Election forensics, post-election audits, Venezue-
lan Presidential Recall Referendum, exit polls, electronic voting systems,
election accuracy.
1. INTRODUCTION
In every democracy, citizens have the opportunity to
participate in elections at different levels. It is critically
important that elections be free and fair, by which we
mean that institutions and safeguards to guarantee full
access of eligible voters and of candidates must be in
place. In most advanced democracies we can reason-
ably assume that this will be the case (except in local-
ized instances of malfeasance or non-intentional error)
but with the advent of many new democracies around
the world, opportunities for irregularities of all kinds
have multiplied (Mebane, 2007).
Since approximately the 1960s (Hyde, 2011), the
practice of inviting international observers to moni-
tor the electoral process as it takes place has become
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almost standard practice. International organizations
such as the United Nations or the Organization of
American States, alongside non-governmental groups
such as the Carter Center, have often been asked to
produce a “seal of approval” for elections that were
expected to be contested. The 2004 Venezuelan Ref-
erendum to Recall the President was one such election
as we discuss below. While ensuring that elections are
free and fair has been the main focus of these organi-
zations in recent years, less has been done about the
question of whether the election outcome reflects the
intentions of the electorate.
Election monitoring, typically conducted by obser-
vation of the electoral process as it occurs in the field,
is aimed at detecting irregularities such as voter access
and the integrity of ballot boxes, but does not address
the issue of election accuracy. We say that an election
is accurate when the outcome of the election is con-
sistent with the preferences of voters. By accurate we
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do not mean perfect; in every election, there will be
some differences between the official vote count and
the actual votes that were cast by the electorate. These
differences are often inconsequential, in that they do
not affect the outcome of the election. When the differ-
ences are large enough to determine an outcome that is
not reflective of voters’ intentions, then the election is
said to be inaccurate (Mebane, 2007).
The consequences of conducting elections that are
provably flawed, either by mistake or by malfeasance,
can be costly from a political, social and even eco-
nomic point of view. A winner who is perceived to be
“illegitimate” might not be able to gain the respect of
disgruntled voters and in extreme cases, might be un-
able to lead (as was the case with the presidential elec-
tions of 2001 in Bangladesh, European Union, 2001).
Further, after an election has been conducted, it is a
challenge to decide what to do even when significant
irregularities have been detected. An example close
to home was the voting in Jasper County, South Car-
olina, during the presidential election of 2000. While
it was clear that tampering with voting machines had
occurred, the legal battles that ensued post-election
did not lead to widely accepted rulings (Jacobson and
Rosenfeld, 2002). (The discussions came to an end
once it was argued that even if the fraudulent voting in
Jasper County had not occurred, South Carolina would
have been a Bush state anyway.) In practical terms, any
remedial measure implemented after an election has
been declared inaccurate has its own limitations and
thus, fixing an election problem after the fact is typi-
cally very difficult.
The introduction of voting machines of different
kinds has created some uncertainty in the outcome of
elections, even in well-established democracies such as
the United States (Lehoucq, 2003). Voting machines do
not always produce printed reports, and when they do,
the reports are unsuitable for detecting voting irregu-
larities (Dopp, 2009). Data reports are rarely produced
in formats that enable statistical analyses and often,
the data are stored in proprietary file formats that limit
their usefulness. Serious errors in vote counting have
been documented; an example of a software failure
that resulted in inexplicably lost votes occurred dur-
ing the 2008 presidential election in several counties
in California, where optical-count scanners manufac-
tured by Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold
Election Solutions) not only did not count votes but
also deleted any signs that the votes had been cast at
all (Zetter, 2008). Voter-verifiable paper ballot records
used by some electronic voting machines are not error-
and tamper-proof either (Balzarotti et al., 2008) be-
cause machines can be programmed to produce appar-
ently matching counts and paper reports that can be dif-
ficult to identify as fraudulent.
Over the last decade or two, there has been renewed
interest in the development of statistical methodology
that can be used in the course of election audits (both
pre- and post-election) to detect irregularities and guar-
antee the integrity of the elections. The ultimate goal
of election auditing is to determine whether the win-
ner of the election has been called correctly. In the
United States, concerns about the legitimacy of elec-
tions reached a new height after the 2000 presidential
election, where a combination of flawed administra-
tive practices, voter suppression and other irregulari-
ties threw into question the outcome in Florida. The
idea that the results of an election should be confirmed
via some kind of post-election manual tallying is be-
coming more accepted and has been institutionalized in
many states in the U.S. In California, for example, the
law now requires that ballots cast in no fewer than one
percent of the precincts in any election be manually re-
counted (Saltman, 2006; Stark, 2008). Many other state
legislatures are considering bills that will also require a
post-election audit of anywhere between 1% and 10%
of the precincts, selected randomly in different ways.
While these are positive steps toward creating a system
for carrying out post-election audits in an “objective”
way, no system that establishes a fixed proportion of
precincts to be audited can guarantee that a full man-
ual recount would confirm the outcome, with a suffi-
ciently high probability. Stark (2008, 2010) proposes
an approach to sample precincts that depends on the
apparent margin of victory, the number of precincts in
the election, the number of ballots cast in each precinct
and the target level of confidence that the real winner
is called. McCarthy et al. (2008) propose a similar ap-
proach to selecting precincts for post-election manual
ballot re-count that depends on the power with which
we wish to identify the true election winner. The col-
lection of technologies and methods that can be used
to assess the legitimacy of elections is known as elec-
tion forensics (Mebane, 2007). In addition to the more
statistical aspects of election forensics, other published
research has focused on the mechanics of post-election
auditing (Estok, Nevitte and Cowan, 2002; Norden et
al., 2007).
The manuscripts that are included in this issue of
Statistical Science propose different but complemen-
tary methods to collect, analyze and interpret post-
election data, and provide an overview of the type of
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statistical tools that can be useful in evaluating the in-
tegrity of an election. The motivation for all of the
manuscripts included in this set was the 2004 refer-
endum carried out in Venezuela, where voters were
asked to vote YES or NO to the question of whether
President Hugo Chávez should be recalled. Questions
about the election’s accuracy were raised almost im-
mediately and several groups in Venezuela and abroad
set out to analyze some of the data that became avail-
able after the official results were announced. While
the manuscripts included in this issue suggest that var-
ious forms of apparently intentional tampering seem
to have occurred, other contributions to the literature
(Taylor, 2005; Weisbrot, Rosnick and Tucker, 2004) ar-
gue that the evidence is insufficient to conclude that the
outcome of the referendum was not correct.
The remainder of this introduction is organized as
follows. First, we briefly describe the 2004 presiden-
tial referendum in Venezuela. We then discuss each of
the five manuscripts that comprise the Venezuela refer-
endum set. We finish with a brief conclusions section.
2. THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL RECALL
REFERENDUM IN VENEZUELA
In 1998, President Hugo Chávez was elected Presi-
dent of Venezuela with almost 58% of the vote. As is
required in Venezuela, the election was organized by
the CNE (Consejo Nacional Electoral), a body com-
posed of five individuals who must be confirmed by
the legislative branch of the Venezuelan government
and that has the mission of ensuring that elections are
transparent and conducted according to the electoral
normatives. In 1999, a new national Constitution was
enacted. The new Constitution allowed for the conduct
of presidential recall referenda and established the pro-
tocol under which this type of referendum could be
conducted. In 2000, President Chávez agreed to run for
early re-election and was re-elected to a new six-year
term with almost 60% of the vote. While the integrity
of the 2000 election already raised some questions, no
formal challenge was submitted. However, the politi-
cal situation in Venezuela continued to deteriorate and
led to a national strike that was resolved only when a
new CNE was established in 2003 (with mediation by
the Carter Center) and agreed to organize a presidential
recall referendum to be conducted in 2004.
The presidential recall referendum (RR) was con-
ducted in August of 2004. This election was the first
in which touch-screen voting machines were ever used
in a national election in Venezuela. A large proportion
(about 87%) of all votes were cast in voting centers
that used touch-screen voting machines. The machines
produced a vote confirmation paper receipt for each
voter, that were deposited in sealed ballot boxes. Most
of those paper voting records were not analyzed. The
machines were connected to the totalizing servers of
the CNE via telephone lines and transmitted the vot-
ing totals in each specific machine to the servers. Two
post-election audits of a subset of the voting centers
were conducted in cooperation with the Carter Center
and with the Organization of American States.
In the RR, participants could choose to vote SI (to
recall the president) or NO (to allow him to remain in
his post). The official count was 59% for NO and 41%
for SI. The Carter Center declared that the elections
had been fair and transparent and their report pointed to
no major irregularities (Carter Center, 2005a, 2005b).
Other non-governmental organizations, however, car-
ried out analyses of different sets of data arising from
the election and the two post-election audits and raised
questions about the integrity of the RR.
3. ANALYSES OF THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL
RECALL REFERENDUM
Here we briefly introduce the manuscripts that were
accepted for inclusion in the Venezuela issue. Four
of the manuscripts, those by Hausmann and Rigobon,
Prado and Sansó, Pericchi and Torres, and Martín sug-
gest that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that
the referendum was fraudulent. In contrast, the contri-
bution by Jiménez, while still declaring the RR out-
come to be illegitimate, argues that the available in-
formation is not conclusive enough to declare that the
official results are incorrect in the sense of Hausmann
and Rigobón, Prado and Sansó, or Pericchi and Torres.
3.1 Delfino and Salas
Delfino and Salas compare the proportion of YES
votes in each voting center with the proportion of vot-
ers registered in that center who had signed the petition
to request the referendum. The assumption underlying
their analysis is that most of the people who signed
the petition for the referendum are likely to vote YES.
This is a plausible assumption given that no signature
collection centers were allowed outside of Venezuela
(yet voting centers were established in embassies and
consulates around the world) and that individuals par-
ticipating in the signature drive were easily identifiable
by the government (but votes cast during the referen-
dum were secret).
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Delfino and Salas find discrepancies between what
one might expect given the distribution of signing reg-
istered voters across centers and the official proportion
of YES votes in each of the centers. These discrepan-
cies appear to be larger in voting centers with touch-
screen voting machines than in non-computerized cen-
ters. In the more populous centers (where the number
of registered voters is largest) the relationship between
the proportion of YES votes appears to be too tightly
associated with the proportion of registered voters who
signed the petition for the referendum.
Finally, the authors also compare the correlation be-
tween the proportion of YES votes and the proportion
of signatures in each voting center, in two groups of
centers defined by the proportion of signatures, in dif-
ferent elections that were held in the same voting cen-
ters between 1998 and 2004 and find inexplicable re-
sults. In all other elections, the correlations are low in
centers with small percentages of registered voters who
signed the petition, and higher in centers with large
proportions of signatures. In contrast, the correlations
were very high in both groups of voting centers during
the RR, a result that cannot be easily explained.
3.2 Pericchi and Torres
Pericchi and Torres propose an approach to evaluate
the integrity of elections that relies on the Newcomb–
Benford Law for first and second digits and on a gener-
alization of the law for cases where the total number of
observations is capped. The main goal of the Pericchi
and Torres work is to develop a new statistical tool that
can be used in a wide variety of applications to deter-
mine whether numerical outcomes show irregularities.
The Newcomb–Benford Law establishes that the dis-
tribution of digits (first, second, etc.) is not uniform.
In principle, therefore, one can compare the distribu-
tion of first significant digits, second significant digits
and so on to the distribution that would be expected
under the Newcomb–Benford Law, and use the dis-
crepancy as a test statistic for the hypothesis that the
observed distribution of digits is not due to tamper-
ing. The Newcomb–Benford Law holds only asymp-
totically when the digits arise from aggregated unit-less
counts in small samples. Because the distribution of the
first significant digit depends on the size of the sample,
Pericchi and Torres suggest that the second Benford
Law (or the law that refers to the distribution of the
second significant digit) has better statistical properties
in small samples.
The authors use several elections around the world
to illustrate the approach they propose for detecting de-
partures from what would be expected under no irreg-
ularities. They find that in all cases, the null hypoth-
esis that the frequency distribution of second signifi-
cant digits behaves according to Newcomb–Benford is
not rejected. The only exception is the 2004 Venezue-
lan presidential recall referendum, where the Bayes
factor for assessing the posterior probabilities of the
null model and the observed frequency distribution for
the second significant digit suggest that the Newcomb–
Benford model is not consistent with the observed fre-
quencies.
A valuable contribution in this manuscript is the ex-
tension of the law to cases where the total number of
counts is bounded. Under a restriction on the maximum
number of counts, different voting precincts (or other
units) tend to have a constant number of voters. Peric-
chi and Torres show that the frequency distribution of
the second significant digit is less sensitive to depar-
tures from the expected behavior under the law even
when the total number of units in each center is about
the same.
3.3 Prado and Sansó
Prado and Sansó use exit poll data from two in-
dependent surveys conducted during the RR by a
non-governmental organization called Súmate and by
Primero Justicia, a political party in the opposition.
Both groups collected voting information nationwide,
by interviewing voters as they exited the voting cen-
ters. To guarantee confidentiality, respondents were
asked to put their vote in a sealed envelope and in a
box similar to ballot boxes. No other information—
gender, age, socio-economic status or any other—was
collected from the participants.
The forecasts that were obtained from both exit polls
were in remarkable agreement. Both predicted that the
YES vote would win, with about 60% of the total votes
cast. The sharp discrepancy with the official CNE re-
sults, which reported that the NO vote was about 59%,
was the motivation for the Prado and Sansó contribu-
tion.
Prado and Sansó carry out a simple analysis, that
consists in exploring whether the exit poll results are
likely if we were to assume that the official CNE elec-
tion results are true. In other words, if in fact the NO
received almost 60% of the vote, what is the proba-
bility that we would observe the exit poll results that
were observed in each voting center? The calculation
ELECTION FORENSICS 475
is tantamount to computing a p-value for the hypoth-
esis that the CNE results are correct, when using the
exit poll results as the test statistic. They find that for
a large proportion of the voting centers, these p-values
are small, typically below 0.02, providing some evi-
dence against the assumption that the CNE results are
reliable. They note that this result is observed in cen-
ters all over the country, whether large or small and for
both computerized and manual voting systems.
The disagreement between the official results and
what the exit polls predicted can be attributable to fac-
tors other than tampering by the CNE. Prado and Sansó
offer several alternative explanations for the differ-
ences, but provide arguments that cast doubt on most
of them. Still, this type of analysis, while suggestive,
in no way can lead to a conclusion of tampering by the
government, something with which the authors readily
agree. While inconclusive, the comparison of official
results and believable forecasts is a useful tool to at
least call attention to electoral events where irregulari-
ties may be present.
Some potentially significant drawbacks in the Prado
and Sansó analyses are listed here. First, they have no
information at all about the proportion of voters who
refused to respond to the exit poll survey. Second, they
do not know anything about the non-respondents. If we
are to reasonably assume that the probability of being
a respondent in the exit poll is associated with voting
patterns, then the conclusions from their study can be
dramatically altered if the proportion of nonignorable
nonrespondents happens to be large. Jiménez (see be-
low) also mentions the fact that Prado and Sansó ap-
pear to ignore the fact that the sample of voters to be
interviewed by exit pollsters was not a simple random
sample but rather was stratified by gender, age cate-
gory, time of day and other variables. As long as re-
spondents were selected randomly within stratum and
as long as the number of individuals in each stratum
is proportional to the number of persons in the popula-
tion in the same stratum, the Prado and Sansó analysis
is adequate.
3.4 Martín
Martín’s analyses are novel in that she uses what
might be termed metadata. Metadata means differ-
ent things in different contexts; in the survey context,
metadata include, for example, the time it takes each
respondent to complete the survey, the number of at-
tempts made to contact the participant, etc. (Groves et
al., 2009). In summary, metadata arise from the process
of conducting the election rather than from the election
itself. Martín uses information on the number of bytes
of incoming and ongoing data to CNE servers, start and
close time of connections between voting centers and
CNE servers, and number of data packets in the incom-
ing and outgoing transmissions.
Martín finds unexplainable differences in the volume
of information transmitted (both outgoing and incom-
ing) by what she calls High Traffic Centers and Cellular
Centers when compared with the Low Traffic Centers.
From a technological point of view and given election
normative, transmitted data behavior should not differ
across centers. Further, Martín finds that there is a sta-
tistically significant association between the number of
votes cast in a center and the size of the packets that
were transmitted from the center to the CNE servers;
this is unexpected under the election normative that re-
quires that centers transmit only a total count to CNE.
These findings prompt Martín to suggest that CNE
servers, voting machines or both might have been pro-
grammed to process votes in different types of voting
centers differently. Other explanations for the differen-
tial behaviors are possible as well, and in the absence
of information about the association between transmis-
sion volume and type of voting center, it is not possible
to conclude that tampering took place. Martín’s contri-
bution, however, is valuable in that it highlights the use
of transmission metadata and proposes approaches to
explore those data. Electronic voting systems are be-
coming the norm worldwide, and therefore, forensic
methods that make use of transmission metadata might
become the standard hot auditing approach. The lim-
itations of Martín’s approach can serve to inform fu-
ture protocols, so that more conclusive (perhaps even
causal) conclusions can be reached in election audit-
ing.
3.5 Hausmann and Rigobón
Hausman and Rigobón use the same exit poll data
that were analyzed in the Prado and Sansó manuscript.
In addition, they also use the (known) proportion of
signatures in favor of holding the referendum, by vot-
ing center. Hausmann and Rigobón reason as follows:
both the proportion of signatures in a voting center and
the proportion of reported YES votes collected in the
exit poll at the center are independent and noisy mea-
surements of the vote intention of voters in the center.
Voters in a center who had earlier signed the petition
for a referendum are expected to have cast a YES vote,
but for many reasons, it is also expected that the num-
ber of actual YES votes in a center will not be identical
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to the number of voters who signed the petition. Sim-
ilarly, if the exit polls are reasonably well conducted,
one would expect that in those centers where the vot-
ers cast a high percentage of YES votes, the survey
numbers would also indicate a large proportion of YES
votes. Because the noise in the two estimates of inten-
tion of vote are due to different factors, it is also reason-
able to think that the errors in the two measurements
will be uncorrelated.
The authors found that the correlation between the
estimated residuals from models where the observed
number of YES votes were regressed on either the pro-
portion of signatures or on the predicted proportions of
YES in the exit polls were highly correlated, at least in
voting centers where by all indications, the YES should
have defeated the NO votes. By using a latent variable
approach to explain this apparent correlation, they con-
clude that the evidence leads to rejection of the null
hypothesis of no electronic fraud. The statistical ev-
idence, coupled with several other observations, lead
these authors to conclude that voting machines in about
70% of the voting centers were manipulated to produce
official counts that did not reflect voters’ intent.
In addition to the analyses described above, Haus-
mann and Rigobón also address the issue of selection
of voting centers where a hot audit was conducted by
the government. Each voting machine provided voters
with a paper confirmation of their vote. The paper bal-
lots were to be put in a sealed ballot box that could
later be used to audit the accuracy of the tallies by
the voting machines. An audit conducted on the same
day in which the voting took place selected what was
supposed to be a random sample of 1% of voting ma-
chines. For these, the machine tallys were to be com-
pared with the paper ballots in the ballot box. This
audit was conducted in a less than satisfactory way
(see the Carter Center report of 2004). Hausmann and
Rigobón argue that the selection of voting machines
for this audit was far from random and indeed suggest
that the CNE selected machines only from those cen-
ters in which the CNE knew no electronic fraud had
been committed.
The Hausmann and Rigobón conclusions that fraud
did indeed occur are somewhat of a stretch given the
evidence. While it is true that the null hypotheses of
no departures from what would be expected if the elec-
tion results reflected voters’ intentions is rejected, there
may be many other explanations for what was ob-
served. Undoubtedly, the results from these analyses
are persuasive, in particular when coupled with other
facts such as the refusal of the CNE to share its ran-
dom number generator for selecting machines to be
audited. In a briefing paper published by the Center for
Economic and Policy Research, Weisbrot, Rosnick and
Tucker (2004) state that not only the random number
generator but the source code and other relevant mate-
rial were shared by the CNE with a group of interna-
tional observers.
3.6 Jiménez
The manuscript by Jiménez serves both as a valu-
able contribution to this issue and also as a discussion
of several of the other manuscripts we include here.
Jiménez uses only the actual votes that were cast in
each voting machine in voting centers with two or more
machines. In the absence of a full manual count of the
paper ballots, Jiménez proposes that the most reliable
approach consists in testing a sequence of hypothe-
ses that account for scenarios where irregularities were
present but are explainable by causes other than delib-
erate fraud.
Jiménez proposes to base all inference on the sam-
pling distribution of test statistics which can be derived
by permutation of the voting cards of each voter in
each voting center. First, he assumes that the joint con-
ditional distribution of outcomes per voting machine
given the total vote count in each center is a multivari-
ate hypergeometric distribution. If we observe ν votes
in a machine, where y and n correspond to YES and
NO votes, and where ν − y − n correspond to OUT
votes (where OUT denotes votes that are not valid for
different reasons), any such vector of size ν can be
viewed as a permutation of a vector with the same
counts, but where votes are shuffled across voters in
the machine. That is, if voters are randomly assigned
to machines, then given (ν, y, n) any permutation of
vote cards has the same probability of occurring.
Jiménez formulates the null hypothesis of a fair ref-
erendum, where the votes per machine correspond to
a random draw from the multivariate hypergeometric
distribution indexed by (ν, y, n). A main point in his
discussion is that rejection of the null hypothesis does
not imply that the referendum was unfair; other alterna-
tives are also possible. He proceeds by formulating and
testing several alternative hypotheses and finally con-
cludes that indeed, the departures from the null model
that were observed in the 2004 RR cannot be explained
by innocent mistakes or random chance.
The final conclusion from Jiménez’s analysis is, as
in the earlier contributions, that the irregularities in the
referendum introduced a bias in favor of the winning
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position, and that the bias was large enough to have
resulted in the incorrect result with high probability.
Even though Jiménez agrees at least in part with the
other contributors, he is critical of several of the ap-
proaches that they used to arrive at their results. One
such criticism is that no one made use of the “full in-
formation” that was available from the official reports.
By “full information” Jiménez refers to the nonvalid
votes and abstentions reported at the lowest electoral
unit level. While his point that all available informa-
tion ought to be used in forensic analyses is well taken,
it seems that in the case of the 2004 Venezuelan RR
this additional piece of data did not lead to results that
contradicted those by the other authors in this issue.
4. DISCUSSION
There are many ways in which an election can be
rigged, so that the outcome does not in the end reflect
voters’ intentions. The increasing popularity of elec-
tronic voting systems has allowed for the possibility
of subtle tampering that can be difficult to identify ex-
cept through a complete audit. In some instances, even
completing an audit can be a challenge if the electronic
voting machines do not produce a paper confirmation
of vote that can be saved for a manual count if the audit
becomes necessary.
There has been quite a lot of discussion in the recent
literature on how to define an election protocol that can
reduce the opportunity for fraud (or even innocent mis-
takes) and increase voter confidence in the outcome.
An example is the work by Elklit and Reynolds (2002),
who propose an election assessment approach consist-
ing of 11 different steps (see their Table 1). For each
step, Elklit and Reynolds provide performance indica-
tors and also variables that can be used to determine
whether the performance is adequate. Dopp (2009) fo-
cuses on post-election auditing protocols and presents
a comprehensive set of procedures to be carried out
before the post-election audit begins, as it progresses
and once it has been completed. Dopp and Elklit and
Reynolds, and indeed much of the political science lit-
erature, emphasize the procedural aspect of election as-
sessment and auditing. Stark (2008), in contrast, views
the issue of designing a post-election audit as a con-
strained optimization problem and provides insight on
the size of the post-election audit sample as well as
a sequential testing approach that either confirms the
election outcome after a partial audit or leads to a com-
plete re-count.
The collection of manuscripts included in this Vene-
zuela issue provides good insight into some of the sta-
tistical tools that may be useful when evaluating the
integrity of an election. While the focus of most of
the work was the 2004 Presidential Recall Referen-
dum held in Venezuela, the major contribution of the
Venezuela issue is methodological; the manuscripts in
this issue propose creative ways in which different
sources of information arising in an election can be
analyzed and interpreted to assess the election. None
of the election forensic projects described in this is-
sue can, by themselves, provide convincing evidence
that irregularities observed in the electoral process are
due to deliberate fraud. Even Jiménez, who proposes
the most sophisticated (from a statistical viewpoint)
methodology, is still unable to establish that tamper-
ing occurred with certainty. The collection of tools and
conclusions, however, does paint a persuasive picture
which suggests that a battery of tests and data sources
may be more effective for election performance assess-
ment than a single method.
Because it is so critical that the true winner is called
in an election, it would be ideal if we could design elec-
tion audit procedures that allow causal inference. This,
however, is not possible and as a consequence election
forensics can only suggest associations. The approach
proposed by Martín, however, can be amenable to a
quasi-experimental design if the properties of the trans-
missions between voting machines and central servers
are well understood before the election begins; this
would allow deciding if the behavior of transmissions
that are carried out during the election is surprising in
some way. Martín’s work shows, above all, that there
are ways other than traditional vote counting that can
shed some light on the quality of an election.
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